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Summary 
 
Over the last decades, referenda, as a form of direct democracy, became a 
popular tool for resolving important questions, such as European Union 
accession, in particular states, however as the recent developments have 
shown, the issue of  rights of sexual minorities has become a quite popular 
topic for referenda too. Referenda on human rights, also known as “anti-
homosexual” referenda, discriminatory referenda or referenda on the 
protection of family, are dedicated to resolving the questions of same-sex 
marriages, partnerships, adoption of children by same-sex couples or non-
compulsory sexual education of children, by citizens themselves. Simply 
put, the majority is deciding about the rights of sexual minority with a great 
risk that the adoption of referenda results might create discrimination 
against one community and division in the society on the citizens of the first 
and second order, by attacking the very dignity of these people. This paper 
explores the issue of above mentioned referenda on human rights, with the 
aim to firstly establish the importance of addressing this issue by the 
European Court of Human Rights. Secondly with the aim to examine what 
role does European Court of Human Rights has in these cases e.g. what, if 
anything, it should be able to do and which approach it should adopt. The 
importance of addressing this issue will be established through the 
identification of available protection for the victims of such referendum 
under ECHR, analysis of the impact of direct democracy on the human 
rights of minorities, including its negative effects, and through analysis of 
discriminatory nature of such a referendum. The role of European Court of 
Human rights will be determined through analysis of relevant provisions of 
ECHR and case law of ECtHR, and the suggestions for the Court´s approach 
towards this issue will be drawn upon the example of U.S. judicial system, 
which already has plenty of experience in this area. 
 
Key words: referendum, LGBTI, human rights, protection, 
discrimination, ECtHR. 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Contextual Background 
 
Democracy is one of the prevailing features and principles common to all 
member states in European Union. Over the last decades, more and more 
questions in European states have been decided by referenda, as a form of 
direct democracy. The referenda have mostly dealt with the European Union 
accession of particular states however as the recent developments have 
shown, the issue of LGBTI rights has become a quite popular topic for 
citizen initiatives (consequently referenda) also. 
Referenda on human rights (“anti-homosexual” referenda, 
discriminatory referenda) already took place in Slovenia, Croatia, Slovakia 
and Ireland e.g. in the countries of European Union to which tolerance, 
principle of non-discrimination, equality and respect for human dignity and 
human rights are the core values. In these referenda, the citizens voted for or 
against same-sex marriages, partnerships, and the adoption of children by 
same-sex couples or about the non-compulsory sexual education of children. 
In other words, the majority was deciding about the rights of sexual 
minority with a great risk that the adoption of referenda result might create 
discrimination against one community and division in the society on the 
citizens of the first and second order, by attacking the very dignity of these 
people. 
Within European Union, a society founded upon the protection of 
human rights and dignity, where we are all equal and violations of our 
fundamental rights are not tolerated, this issue needs to be properly 
addressed in order to achieve justice for the victims of such a referenda. 
 
 
 
1.2 General Purpose 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate into the issue of referenda on 
human rights, which recently took place in some European countries, and 
thus are not just hypothesises but instead real life events, and should be 
dealt with by the European Court of Human Rights. The thesis will apprise 
of available protection under ECHR for victims of this referenda, draw 
attention to a conflict, into which direct democracy gets with human rights, 
underlying the possible negative effects of afore mentioned referendum, 
discuss whether such a referendum complies with the principle of equality 
and non-discrimination within the legal framework of EU, establish the 
necessity to address this issue and examine an approach taken towards this 
issue by more experienced U.S. system upon which the suggestions for the 
approach of ECtHR will be drawn. 
 
1.3 Research Question 
 
In order to fulfil the general purpose of this thesis, it is crucial to answer the 
research questions:  
 
 1. “What is the role of European Court of Human Rights in the cases, when 
a discriminatory referendum is approved by one of the Member states, e.g. 
what should the Court, if anything, be able to do about it?” 
 
2. “Should the Court use proactive or reactive approach towards this 
issue?” 
 
1.4 Delimitations 
 
This paper is not focused on discussing the specific referendum in Slovakia, 
described in the third chapter, or on the possibility of challenging this 
particular referendum and accession of justice for its victims. Referendum 
which took place in Slovakia was taken only as an example of referendum 
on human rights in order for the reader to understand this issue. The focus of 
the thesis lies on the referenda on human rights in general.  
Further this paper does not concentrate on the debate concerning 
direct democracy vs. representative democracy, on the comparison of these 
two types of democracy, on undermining of the importance of direct 
democracy and on the question who is supposed to decide about the matters 
subject to human rights referendum. The intention of this thesis is to draw 
attention to the fact that it is possible for direct democracy to come into 
conflict with human rights, which can have negative effects, and to pose a 
question to the reader, whether it is suitable to decide such matters by these 
democratic tools. However, despite the fact, that this thesis is more focused 
on direct democracy, it is important to highlight that this does not change 
the fact that also other forms of democracy are often used to underline the 
rights of minorities. There is no reason to assume that this situation is going 
to be different when looking at democracy as a whole or when talking about 
representative democracy. Democracy, simply put, impersonates one person 
- one vote, thus underrepresentation of minorities is inevitable. 
The right to access to justice as a whole, including individuals or a 
group trying to enforce their rights and possibly obtain remedies, together 
with the right to a fair trial, is not a subject of analysis in this thesis because 
in order to determine how can the victims achieve justice it is firstly crucial 
to explore the existence of legal protection under the given circumstances.  
No other legal framework, than specific regulations of European 
Union, especially ECHR, and case law of European Court of Human Rights 
are taken into account in the course of analysis. Referendum on Human 
rights is viewed as violating human rights and thus appropriate human rights 
instruments were used in order to analyse what can be done against such a 
referendum.  
This thesis is not a constitutional thesis, although it has some 
constitutional aspects. It does not discuss the constitutional role of ECtHR, 
but instead the focus of discussion is on the protection of LGBTI because of 
the subject of referenda.  
1.5 Methodology 
 
The present study analyzes the role and the approach of European Court of 
Human Rights in the cases when a referendum on human rights 
(discriminatory referendum) has been approved by Member States of 
European Union. It uses a combination of philosophical and analytical 
method, related to qualitative method. Philosophical method implies 
formulation of questions to be answered or problems to be solved with 
assumption, that the more clearly the question or problem is stated, the 
easier it is to identify the critical issues. This is projected in the thesis by 
formulating research questions upon which the arguments of the thesis are 
founded on. In order to analyze the role of ECtHR in cases of above 
mentioned referenda, it is firstly necessary to elaborate on the main issue 
with this referenda, which is the availability of protection for the victims, 
and secondly, to explain how such a referendum takes place, why it is 
dangerous, discriminatory and simultaneously violating human rights and 
thus fundamental to address such a referendum. The analytical method is 
demonstrated by introducing different arguments regarding these issues in 
every chapter and their subsequent analysis in a form of small conclusions 
at the end of chapters. The whole thesis culminates in a big analysis of 
available protection under the ECHR and within the case law of ECtHR 
against this referendum, conjointly with the proposal of suggestions for the 
ECtHR´s approach towards the issue, based upon previously examined 
approach of U.S. courts.   
 
1.6 Material 
 
The research included a review of available literature, examination of a 
selection of relevant instruments within legislative framework of EU and 
U.S., review of relevant ECtHR case law, U.S. Supreme Court case law, as 
well as related human right organizations reports, handbooks and newspaper 
articles. Because of shortage of literature about this topic, most of the 
research is based upon articles, coming from experience of U.S. with this 
subject. In order to establish the necessity for addressing of this referendum 
by ECtHR, the attention was placed upon articles discussing the effects of 
direct democracy on human rights of minorities, in conjunction with 
analysis of European principle of equality and non-discrimination.  
 
1.7 State of Research 
 
Despite the fact, that the first referendum on human rights, subject to this 
thesis, took place in 2012 in Slovenia, there has been no specific research 
done and published about this topic within Europe. Several articles, such as, 
“Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote” by Barbara Gamble or “Do 
Popular Votes on Rights Create Animosity toward Minorities?” by Todd 
Donovan and Caroline Tolbert, regarding the conflict between human rights 
and direct democracy, based on the experience from U.S., have been 
published and also included in this thesis. However, except for an analysis 
of Swiss referenda touching upon human rights issues in publication “Of 
Minarets and Foreign Criminals, Swiss Direct Democracy and Human 
Rights” by Daniel Moeckli (also included in this thesis), this topic has not 
been specifically discussed with regards to legal framework of European 
Union together with the role of European Court of Human Rights in these 
matters, and thus my thesis fills in a gap and it is an original product. 
 
1.8 Structure 
 
Already stated, this paper examines the role and approach of European 
Court of Human Rights in cases when a referendum on human rights 
(discriminatory referendum) has been approved by Member States of 
European Union. The second chapter identifies main issue of this 
referendum, which is the availability of protection for its victims under 
ECHR. An explanation of what amounts to a referendum on human rights, 
for the purposes of this paper, based on the example of referendum in 
Slovakia is provided in the third chapter. In the fourth chapter, the attention 
is drawn to the fact that it is possible for the direct democracy (not 
undermining the fact, that it happens in any other form of democracy also) 
to come into conflict with human rights and gives an insight into two 
mechanisms of direct democracy – referenda and citizen´s initiatives. In 
order to establish a discriminatory character of referenda portrayed in the 
third chapter, the fifth chapter elaborates on the meaning of principle of 
equality and non-discrimination, including the legal sources of this principle 
together with types of discrimination, and culminates in a discussion 
regarding the discriminatory character of such referenda. The sixth chapter 
gives an insight into the proactive approach of U.S. courts connected to 
Equal Protection Clause, which purpose is to fight discrimination, in 
conjunction with methods of scrutiny used by U.S. Courts and concludes 
with a landmark decision of U.S. Supreme Court related to discrimination 
based on sexual orientation. A short summarization of this thesis and 
analysis of available protection, discussed in the second chapter, are 
provided in the seventh chapter together with a series of suggestions for 
ECtHR´s approach towards this issue. In the last chapter, a conclusion 
together with the answer to the research question is presented. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Main Issue of Referendum – Available Protection 
 
The European Convention on Human Rights1 (ECHR) envisages a 
fundamental human rights instrument within the legislative framework of 
European Union (EU). It was the first comprehensive treaty in the world in 
this field, establishing the first international complaints procedure and the 
first international court for the determination of human rights matters.2 With 
the entry into force of Lisbon Treaty it was provided for EU accession to the 
European Convention on Human Rights and all Member States of EU had to 
become parties to the Convention.3  
ECHR guarantees protection to all those within the jurisdiction of a 
Member State, aside from the fact whether they are citizens or not, and even 
beyond the national territory to those areas under the effective control of the 
State (such as occupied territories).4 At the same time, in Article 19, it 
provides for a machinery to ensure the observance and enforcement of these 
rights in the form of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).5  
The Convention is comprised of three sections.6 The first section 
contains a catalogue of the fundamental rights and freedoms, which the 
signatory states have to guarantee, and additional rights are enshrined in 
Protocols to the Convention, which were added as the consensus regarding 
human rights standards among the contracting states and are binding only to 
those states which have ratified them.7  
                                                 
1 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 4 
November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) ETS 005 (ECHR). 
2 Philip Alston, Ryan Goodman : International Human Rights: The Successor to 
International Human Rights in Context : Law, Politics and Morals (Oxford University 
Press, 2013) 891. 
3 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the 
European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007, O.J. C 306/01 (Lisbon 
Treaty). 
4 See e.g. Loizidou v. Turkey, App. no. 15318/89 (18 December 1996). 
5 ECHR (n 1). 
6 ECHR (n 1). 
7 Alston (n 2) 896. 
Evolutive interpretation of Convention is fundamental to the 
effectiveness of ECHR system and ECtHR´s authority.8  ECtHR has 
affirmed that Convention is a living instrument which should be interpreted 
in the light of present day conditions.9 A dynamic reading of ECHR ensures 
that its rights are made practical and effective and evolutive interpretation 
provides a necessary degree of flexibility to ECHR law in a rapidly 
changing environment.10 
This chapter will introduce the main issues of available protection 
under ECHR for the victims of referendum on human rights (discriminatory 
referendum), described in the third chapter. 
 
2.1 European Convention on Human Rights 
 
The referenda on human rights took place in several European Countries. In 
these referenda, human dignity and human rights of sexual minorities have 
been put to a vote. In order to determine, whether the victims of such 
referenda can achieve justice, it is necessary to firstly examine available 
protection for these victims under ECHR. This chapter will present relevant 
Articles of ECHR which are eligible to be invoked in the case of referenda 
on human rights. 
Article 6 of ECHR provides for a right to a fair trial. According to 
this Article, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law 
in the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal 
charge against him. It further elaborates, in section 2, on the presumption of 
innocence and in section 3 on the minimum rights granted to persons 
charged with criminal offence.  
Right to an effective remedy is included in Article 13 of ECHR. It 
declares that everyone whose rights and freedoms, as set forth in this 
                                                 
8 Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou : European Consensus and the Evolutive Interpretation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, German Law Journal Vol.12 No.10 (1731, 2011) 
1732.  
9 Tyrer v.the United Kingdom, App. no. 5856/72 (25 April 1978) s.183. 
10 Dzehtsiarou (n 8) 1732. 
Convention, are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national 
authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons 
acting in an official capacity. 
The right to a fair trial and the right to an effective remedy together 
constitute the right to access to justice.11 This right includes also the rights 
of victims and claimants and its importance lies in the fact that it enables the 
individuals to enforce their substantive rights and obtain remedy when these 
rights are violated.12 In other words, this right secures that the victims of this 
referendum are entitled to complain, about the violation of their rights, and 
obtain remedy for the claimed violation.  
In relation to the subject of referenda and its discriminatory 
character, Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 of ECHR should be 
invoked. Article 14 affords for the prohibition of discrimination on any 
ground such as sexual orientation, which is a part of the subject of 
referendum, since it was directed at LGBTI community.  
Article 8 of ECHR incorporates the right to respect for private and 
family life. It establishes that everyone has the right to respect for his 
private and family life. In section 2, it also sets out a limitation, that there 
shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. The subject of referenda consisted of questions 
regarding the same-sax marriage and adoptions of children which fall within 
the ambit of Article 8.  
There is no autonomous provision within ECHR which would 
address, stop or prohibit referendum on human rights. The victims of this 
referendum can rely only on their right to access to justice and provisions 
                                                 
11 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012/C 326/02 (CFREU); ECHR 
(n 1).  
12 FRA Annual Report : Fundamental Rights: Challenges and Achievements in 2010, 
Chapter 8 : Access to Efficient and Independent Justice <http://fra.europa.eu/ 
sites/default/files/fra_uploads/1644-annual-report-2011-chapter8.pdf> (accessed 21 May 
2015) 141. 
regarding the discrimination and violation of their right to private and 
family life.  
 
2.2 European Court of Human Rights 
 
Article 19 of ECHR states, that European Court of Human Rights was 
established in order to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken 
by the High Contracting Parties in the ECHR, and the Protocols, and that it 
functions on a permanent basis. It´s jurisdiction is extended to all matters 
concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention and the 
Protocols by Article 32 of ECHR. As mentioned before, ECtHR has 
affirmed that the Convention is a living instrument which should be 
interpreted in the light of present day conditions. 
 Article 35 of Convention makes it clear, that the primary 
responsibility for its implementation rests with the Member States and the 
Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies are 
exhausted. ECtHR provides for both, individual petitions, in Article 34, and 
interstate complaints, in Article 33. The wording of Convention in these 
articles establishes that “any High Contracting Party may refer to the Court 
any alleged breach of the provisions of the Convention . . .” and that the 
“Court may receive applications from any person, nongovernmental 
organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation 
by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the 
Convention or the Protocols thereto”. In other words, ECtHR responds only 
to complaints that are made, and this approach is identified as reactive 
approach.13 
 As far as the research of this thesis has been able to uncover, there 
has not been a case of referendum on human rights brought to ECtHR and 
thus there is no special scrutiny developed for these cases as for example in 
                                                 
13 Council of Europe, Steering Committee for Human Rights Council of Europe : 
Reforming the European Convention on Human Rights  : a work in progress : a 
compilation of publications and documents relevant to the ongoing reform of the ECHR / 
prepared by the Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH) Strasbourg (Council of 
Europe, 2009) 348. 
United States of America (U.S.). One could only guess why it is so. Maybe 
one of the reasons behind it is (with the exception of Article 3 of ECHR) 
mostly the reactive approach of ECtHR. In comparison, the U.S. approach 
can be seen as proactive because of the fact, that the U.S. courts recognized 
the necessity for additional protection of certain groups of people, whose 
rights tend to be more endangered than the rights of others, by establishment 
of classification of people into “protected classes” and their connection to 
specific levels of scrutiny, which will be elaborated on further in this thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Referendum on Human Rights in Slovakia 
 
A discriminatory referendum, human rights referendum, “anti-homosexual” 
referendum, referendum “on the protection of family”, selfish referendum, 
etc., all of these names has been assigned to the referenda which took place 
in four European countries – Slovenia, Croatia, Slovakia and Ireland. 
Naturally, one can imagine different scenarios, content and circumstances 
surrounding such referenda and thus this chapter will explain to the reader, 
based on the example of referendum in Slovakia, what is a referendum on 
human rights (for the purposes of this paper).   
 
 3.1 Slovakia 
 
Since 1993, Slovakia is an independent state.14 It can be considered a 
relatively small country, with a total area of 49,035 sq km and population of 
5.4 million people, located in Central Europe.15 It borders with Austria, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Ukraine.16 The ethnic groups within 
the country consist of 80.7% Slovaks, 8.5% Hungarians, 2% Roma people 
and 8.8% unspecified other groups.17 The religious groups are represented 
by Roman Catholics (62%), Protestants (8.2%), Greek Catholics (3.8%), 
other or unspecified groups (12.5%) and atheists (13.4%).18  
According to Article 1 of Slovak Constitution, Slovak Republic is a 
sovereign, democratic state, governed by the rule of law, which is not linked 
to any ideology or religion.19 The type of government, encompassed within 
Article 72 of Constitution, is a parliamentary democracy epitomized by 
National Council of Slovak republic, the highest legislative body. Andrej 
Kiska, Slovak president whose duties are enshrined within Article 101 of 
                                                 
14 The World Factbook, Slovakia <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/lo.html > (accessed 27 April 2015) (The World Factbook). 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid.  
18 Ibid.  
19 Ústava Slovenskej republiky, Ústavný zákon NR SR č. 460/1992 Zb [Slovak 
Constitution]. 
Slovak Constitution, is the head of state. The highest judicial body is the 
Constitutional Court of Slovakia, which rules on constitutional issues.20 
On the 1st of May 200421 Slovakia became a member of European 
Union and together with the other member states it is bound to respect, 
promote and protect the fundamental values and principles of EU, set out in 
Article 1 of the Lisbon Treaty, such as human dignity, liberty, democracy, 
equality, tolerance, non-discrimination, etc. Despite this fact, a referendum 
on the choice between protecting human rights and lives of lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, transgender and intersexed (LGBTI)22 citizens or their deliberate 
exclusion and degradation on the social ladder, took place in this “European 
country”.  
 
 3.2 Legal Protection of LGBTI in Slovakia 
  
In accordance with European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) 
reports, the attitudes towards LGBTI persons in Slovakia are negative.23 
Strong influence of the Catholic Church has been listed as one of the main 
reasons for this. The polls have shown that negative attitudes toward LGBTI 
persons are common among persons with strong religious views24 and 
taking into account that 62% of Slovak population belongs to Catholic 
Church25 one may question whether there exists any legal protection for 
these people. 
 The provisions regulating Human Rights are embodied in chapter 
two of Slovak Constitution. Article 12 of the Constitution guarantees the 
                                                 
20 Slovak Constitution (n 19) chapter 7, part one. 
21 List of countries, EU Member States <http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index_en.htm> 
(accessed 27 April 2015). 
22 Denotation used according to ILGA terminology, for more see <http://ilga.org/> 
(accessed 27 April 2015). 
23 See e.g. Danish Institute for Human Rights: The social situation concerning homophobia 
and discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation in Slovakia (March 2009) available at 
<http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/390-FRA-hdgso-part2-NR_SK.pdf> 
(accessed 27 April 2015) (FRA1); European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights: Legal 
Study on Homophobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Identity (April 2010) available at<http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/1369-
LGBT-2010_thematic-study_SK.pdf> (accessed 27 April 2015) (FRA2).  
24 FRA1 (n 23) 4. 
25 The World Factbook (n 14). 
principle of equal treatment by stating that “people are free and equal in 
dignity and rights”. The criteria for equal treatment included in this Article 
however include only sex, race, colour of skin, language, faith and religion, 
political, or other thoughts, national or social origin, affiliation to a nation, 
or ethnic group, property, descent, or any other status. The criterion of 
sexual orientation is missing in Slovak Constitution. 
Articles 16 and 19 further guarantee the inviolability of the person 
and its privacy; preservation of human dignity, personal honour, reputation; 
and the right to protection against unauthorized interference in private and 
family life.  
Following the entry of Slovakia into European Union, legally 
binding acts of the European Communities and European Union shall have 
primacy over the laws of the Slovak Republic, as stated in Article 7 of 
Constitution. Moreover, in this Article, Slovak Constitution establishes that 
International treaties on human rights and fundamental freedoms shall have 
primacy over the laws.  
The provisions of the Council Directive 2000/78/EC concerning 
prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation in employment and 
occupation have been transposed correctly into Slovak legislation. Since 
14.02.2008 sexual orientation is recognised as a prohibited ground of 
discrimination in all areas covered by the legislation, i.e. besides 
employment, also education, social and health care, and access to goods and 
services.26 However there is no equality body dealing specifically with 
discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation. Besides general 
authorities protecting lawfulness of the state authorities (such as Prosecutors 
office, Public Defender of Rights, etc.) there is the Slovak National Centre 
for Human Rights which deals with all kinds of discrimination but  has no 
judicial or executive authority.27 
Same-sex partnerships or same-sex marriages are not legally 
recognised in Slovakia. 
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3.3 National Legislation Regulating Referenda 
 
Slovak Constitution establishes, in Article 93, that a referendum is used to 
confirm a constitutional law on entering into a union with other states, or on 
withdrawing from that union, and to decide on important issues of public 
interest. According to Article 95, a referendum is called by the President of 
Slovak Republic if requested by a petition signed by a minimum of 350,000 
citizens or on the basis of a resolution of the National Council of the Slovak 
Republic. Article further sets out the limitations for the subject of 
referendum, namely basic rights and freedoms, taxes, levies and the state 
budget cannot constitute a subject of referendum. 
 The President of Slovak Republic may, in conformity with Article 95 
of Constitution, file a petition with the Constitutional Court of Slovak 
Republic, before calling a referendum, in order to determine whether the 
subject of referendum is in compliance with the Constitution or a 
constitutional law, in cases when referendum was called on the basis of 
citizen’s petition or a resolution of the National Council.  This Article 
further specifies, that in a case when the President of the Slovak Republic 
files such a petition with the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic, 
the period within which the referendum should be called shall not continue 
from filing of a petition by the President of the Slovak Republic until the 
decision of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic becomes 
effective. 
 The criteria for the validity of referendum´s results are elaborated on 
in Article 98 of Constitution, and include the participation of more than one-
half of eligible voters and endorsement of referendum´s decision by more 
than one half of the participants. It also establishes that the proposals 
adopted in the referendum shall be promulgated by the National Council in 
the same way as it promulgates laws and that the National Council of 
Slovak Republic can amend or annul results of referendum not sooner than 
three years after the result of the referendum came into effect. 
 
3.4”Anti – Homosexual” Referendum 
 
On April 5 2014, a civic organization - the Alliance for Family (AZR), 
launched a petition claiming that none of the current efforts of Slovak 
politicians sufficiently secure a better protection for marriage and family.28 
Following this petition, in June 2014, the first striking legislation marginally 
engaging with the rights of LGBTI Community in Slovakia occurred.  
The National Council of Slovakia passed a constitutional amendment 
changing the definition of marriage in order to improve the protection of 
“traditional family”. It entered into force on 1st of September 2014 and it 
defines marriage as a union solely between man and woman.29 This 
amendment might be vaguely reminiscent of the infamous 1996 Defense of 
Marriage Act from United States of America, defining marriage as a union 
of one man and one woman, which was overturned in 2013 by the U.S. 
Supreme Court because it denied the "equal liberty" guaranteed by the Fifth 
Amendment to the same-sex couples.30  
AZR insisted that it is necessary to go further than “redefining 
marriage” in the name of the protection of the interests of children, who 
they say, have the right to grow up in a family with a father and a mother 
and to be protected from what they call “inappropriate sexual education” in 
schools.31 One of the AZR leaders, Anton Chromik, expressed his opinion 
that “homosexuals are not asking just for ‘rights,’ but want to shut the 
mouths of other people. They will be making decisions over other people’s 
lives, careers, and that has always in history resulted in dictatorships and 
sometimes even in mass murders.”32 Other anti-gay activist and an 
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outspoken supporter of the referendum, the former Prime Minister of 
Slovakia, Jan Carnogursky, pointed out that “in Russia, one would not even 
have to campaign for this because over there, the protection of traditional 
Christian values is an integral part of government policy”.33 And this is 
where the importance of such referenda lies.  They took place in Europe and 
not in the countries such as Russia or Uganda. 
The main goal of AZR was to change the attitudes of people towards 
family values using the mobilization of people in the referendum campaign 
as a tool.34 In their opinion, based on the experience from other countries, 
waiting for the other side to act and let it repeatedly put pressure to change 
the status quo is not a rational and effective way of protecting values of 
family, marriage and children.35 The success of referendum in Croatia 
provided an encouragement for AZR to organize their own referendum 
protecting family, marriage and children, which results were supposed to 
have an impact on the whole of Europe.36 
Within 5 months they managed to gather 400,000 signatures on a 
petition37 plainly called as an “anti-gay” referendum by its opponents.38 The 
requirements for calling a referendum under the Slovak legislation have 
been met and the organisers wanted to pose four questions to the voters:  
 
1. Do you agree that no other cohabitation of persons other than a 
bond between one man and one woman can be called marriage? 
2. Do you agree that same-sex couples or groups shouldn’t be 
allowed to adopt children and subsequently raise them? 
3. Do you agree that no other cohabitation of persons other than 
marriage should be granted particular protection, rights and duties that the 
legislative norms as of March 1, 2014 only grant to marriage and to 
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spouses (mainly acknowledgement, registration, or recording as a life 
community in front of a public authority, the possibility to adopt a child by 
the spouse of a parent)? 
4. Do you agree that schools cannot require children to participate 
in education pertaining to sexual behaviour or euthanasia if their parents or 
the children themselves do not agree with the content of the education?39 
 
However, instead of calling the referendum, Andrej Kiska, as a first 
president in the whole history of Slovak Republic40, filed a petition with 
Constitutional Court in order to examine whether the proposed questions do 
not contradict the Constitution.41 His decision was influenced by strong 
concern that the subject of referendum might involve the fundamental rights 
and freedoms of people and thus it might not be in conformity with Slovak 
Constitution.42 He stressed out, that it is necessary to interpret the 
fundamental rights and freedoms in terms of the international commitments 
of Slovak Republic and not to limit them only to the rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by the Slovak Constitution.43  
Constitutional Court of Slovakia, an independent judicial body44  
against which ruling there exists no legal recourse45, ruled 3 out of 4 
questions not to interfere with fundamental rights and freedoms of people. 
Only question number 3 was ruled to be inadmissible due to the issue of 
intelligibility and exactness of formulation of legal rules and consecutive 
necessity of interpretation.46 This question was formulated in a way which 
enabled a double sense of understanding because it did not explicitly specify 
which forms of cohabitation were in question. By expression “no other 
forms of cohabitation other than marriage” it enabled the reader to consider 
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all forms of heterosexual cohabitation recognized by Slovak law and 
granted privileges only to cohabitation in form of marriage.47 
Hypothetically, if homosexual forms of cohabitation where recognized by 
Slovak law, they would have been a part of cohabitation which was a 
subject to this question, however, because they are not recognized, this 
question was considered by the constitutional court as lowering the standard 
of fundamental right to protection against unauthorized intervention in 
private and family life, enshrined in Article 19(2) of Slovak Constitution, of 
certain group of people.48 
 When addressing the rest of the questions, the court based its 
argumentation on the case law of European Court of Human Rights. In the 
1st question it concluded that despite the fact that this question as a matter of 
fact falls within the frame of the fundamental right to protection against 
unauthorised interference with family life, it does not have a form of 
fundamental right, excluded from being a subject of a referendum, because 
with regards to the current ECtHR practice49 there is a room to express 
opinion about the same-sex marriage in referendum.50 The subject of 2nd 
question was reviewed as not discriminatory, not a part of a fundamental 
right to protection against unauthorized interference in private and family 
life nor an element of the fundamental right of parents to the care and 
education of children and the right of children to parental care and 
upbringing51 based on the ECtHR practice52 according to which, there 
cannot be any discrimination if the law of a particular state does not provide 
for adoption of children by certain form of cohabitation. And since, in 
Slovakia, adoption is not granted to any other forms of cohabitation than to 
a married couple, discrimination of homosexual couples in comparison to 
unmarried opposite-sex couples is not possible when none of them has a 
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right to adopt children.53 The fundamental right to education was also not 
found to constitute a part of the 4th question because, in the Courts opinion, 
the question in fact suggested a solution of mutual conflict between the 
interests of child, embodied in the fundamental right to education, and those 
of its parents, embodied in article 41 of Slovak Constitution.54 In the context 
of ECtHR this question was found not to interfere with any of fundamental 
rights because the court concluded55 that education in matters of sex can 
interfere in different ways religious beliefs of people "and sexual questions 
may relate to "values that are fundamental to understanding many religions 
and philosophical views". 
After the Constitutional Courts decision came into effect, President 
Andrej Kiska scheduled the above discussed referendum for February 7th 
2015.56 All of the votes have been counted by the Slovakia´s Statistics 
Office and the final tally showed that between 90.3% and 94.5% of 944,209 
Slovaks voting in the referendum agreed to all three questions it asked.57 
However, only 21.4% of 4.41 million eligible voters cast their ballots, far 
less than the 50% needed in order for the referendum to become legally 
binding.58  
The supporters of LGBTI rights were called upon to stay at home 
and not vote in order for the referendum to be invalid and thus not binding. 
But what would it mean if the referendum actually went through? 
Despite the fact, that the referendum was not binding, the threat that 
it is going to happen again, in a different country, is well founded, since 
within one year it already happened, except Slovakia, also in Ireland. In 
addition, there are a lot of questions which stayed unanswered after this 
referendum, such as, why was it necessary to go to such a length, after the 
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adoption of Constitutional marriage amendment, to ban homosexual 
marriages? What about humiliation or discrimination of LGBTI? Of what 
value are the human rights principles in such a democratic society? Is it 
even right, to hold such a referendum in a democratic society? The objective 
of this paper is to provide as much answers for these questions as possible.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Conflict of Democracy and Human Rights 
 
Democracy is a government “of the people, by the people, and for the 
people”.59 It indicates an involvement of the people in the functioning of 
their government. Representative (indirect) democracy and direct 
democracy are viewed as two varieties of democracy.  
Representative democracy is founded on the principle of people 
electing representatives who then both make laws and put them into 
practice.60 In a direct democracy, the electorate (people) votes for or against 
laws or policies.61 Citizens are engaged in making political and institutional 
decisions through various democratic practises such as referenda, citizen´s 
initiatives, agenda initiatives or the recall.62 Use of these mechanisms is 
determined either by the constitution or by individual governments through 
legislation and through the choice and design of the electoral system.63  
Discussions of the use of referendums, citizens’ initiatives and recall 
votes frequently revolve around two opposing positions – strict 
representative approach and direct democracy enthusiasm.64 Strict 
representative approach maintains that direct voting of any kind undermines 
the principle of representative democracy and should ideally be avoided.65 
On the other hand the direct democracy enthusiasts hold the view that there 
are few situations in which the use of the direct vote of the people is not an 
appropriate way to determine the will of the people.66  
However, it is not a purpose of this thesis to choose between these 
opposing positions or to compare direct democracy with representative 
democracy. Nor is it to undermine the importance of direct democracy and 
the usage of referenda and citizen´s initiatives as such. On the contrary, the 
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author is of the opinion that taking a direct part in political and institutional 
decisions of the state as the possibility to bring important issues to a vote by 
citizens themselves is a necessary part of democratic society. Nevertheless 
there are some areas, such as human rights, which should not be a subject of 
voting in a democratic society, where we are all equal and we all have 
human rights simply because we are humans. The purpose of this thesis is to 
draw attention to the fact that it is possible for the democracy to come into 
conflict with human rights and to pose a question to the reader, whether it is 
suitable to decide such a thing by these democratic tools.  
However, despite the fact, that this thesis is more focused on direct 
democracy, it is important to highlight that this does not change the fact that 
also other forms of democracy are often used to underline the rights of 
minorities. There is no reason to assume that this situation is going to be 
different when taking into account democracy as a whole or when talking 
about representative democracy. Democracy, simply put, impersonates one 
person - one vote, thus minorities are going to be underrepresented in any 
case. 
This chapter will give an insight into two mechanisms of direct 
democracy – referenda and citizen´s initiatives, and will elaborate on the 
conflict of direct democracy with human rights. The reason behind 
examining referenda and citizen´s initiative separately is that most of the 
referenda on human rights were organized under the impulse of citizen´s 
initiatives. Considering the fact, that citizens’ initiative is a petition calling 
for a referendum and that the actual referendum is the second step, it is of 
significant importance to examine both of these tools.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Referenda and Citizen´s Initiatives  
 
Some form of direct democracy is provided in most European countries.67 
Referenda, above all, have become more common in Europe in the past two 
decades, when many European states used them to decide whether to join 
the European Union and whether to ratify EU treaties.68 Nowadays, almost 
all European states provides for referenda in their constitutions.69 
The terminology used to describe instruments of direct democracy 
varies between different jurisdictions.70 Sometimes, different terms have 
been used to describe what are essentially the same institutions and 
processes. For example, referendums conducted by the government have 
been sometimes called plebiscites – a term that remains in use today in some 
states.71 Citizens’ initiatives are sometimes also known as popular referenda 
or citizen - initiated referenda.72 The meaning of some of the terms 
describing different institutions and processes of direct democracy has 
changed over the time and is a subject to linguistic variations.73 The 
particular terms relevant for this paper will be explained further and a 
consistent pattern in usage of these terms will be followed. 
 
4.1.1 Referenda 
 
Referenda are “procedures which give the electorate a direct vote on a 
specific political, constitutional or legislative issue.”74 Usually, referenda 
take place when a governing body decides to call for a vote on a particular 
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issue, or when such a vote is required by law under the terms of a 
constitution or other binding legal arrangement.75  
Citizens’ initiatives, on the other hand, “allow the electorate to vote 
on a political, constitutional or legislative measure proposed by a number of 
citizens and not by a government, legislature, or other political authority.”76 
To bring an issue to a vote, the proposers of the petition must gather enough 
signatures in support of it as the law under which the initiative is brought 
forward requires.77 It is important to notice, that a citizens’ initiative is a 
petition calling for a referendum on a legal proposal drafted by the 
citizens.78 And that the actual referendum is the second step.  
As stated above, in a referendum the electorate votes directly on a 
specific political, constitutional or legislative issue, called by political 
authorities. The political authorities are usually defined as the executive and 
legislative institutions of government.79 For example, at the national level 
the executive may consist of a president and/or a prime minister and cabinet, 
and the legislative institutions of the parliament or congress.80 With them 
then rests the decision to call a referendum. 
Referenda can be regulated by a written constitution or general and 
permanent legislation.81 Majority of states in Europe, provide for the 
organization of national referenda in their constitutions.82  
The typical categorization of referenda is as either mandatory or 
optional. Mandatory referendum is a vote of the electorate which is called 
automatically under particular circumstances as defined in the constitution 
or ordinary legislation.83 It is usually restricted to very important political 
decisions such as constitutional amendments, resolving conflicts between 
different governmental branches, adoption of international treaties, joining a 
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supra-national organization and issues of national sovereignty or self -
determination.84 
Optional referendum is a vote of the electorate which does not have 
to be held by law but can be initiated by the government and in some cases 
by other parties.85 The forms of such referendum vary, for example in Spain 
and Austria they are pre-regulated by constitutional rules or otherwise 
prescribed referendum rules, or in Norway and United Kingdom they have a 
form of special (ad hoc) referendum setting forth particular rules to be 
followed specifically for individual referendum.86 These referenda are not 
regulated in the constitution or any permanent legislation and the decision to 
hold such referenda must come from the majority of legislature via passage 
of a specific law authorizing the holding of the special referendum.87 
 
 4.1.2 Citizen´s Initiatives 
 
As mentioned before, most of the referenda on human rights in Europe were 
organized under the impulse of citizen´s initiatives, such as the Alliance for 
Family mentioned in the example of Slovak referendum. On the grounds 
that citizens’ initiative is a petition calling for a referendum and that the 
actual referendum is the second step, the issue of citizen´s initiatives will be 
explained below. 
Initiative is a procedure which allows citizens to put forward a 
proposal.88 There are two forms of an initiative put forward by the citizens 
and designed to be concluded with a referendum vote - citizens’ initiative 
and the citizen´s demanded referendum.89  
Citizens’ Initiative (also called a ‘popular initiative’) stands for a 
number of citizens presenting a political proposal (e.g. draft legislation) and 
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registering public support by obtaining a required number of signatures, 
thereby forcing a referendum (popular vote) on the issue.90  
A citizen-demanded referendum is an optional referendum, which is 
initiated or triggered, by a number of citizens referring to existing laws or 
political or legislative proposals.91 There are two types of such a 
referendum. The abrogative referendum which allows repeal of an existing 
law (or its parts) and the rejective referendum which allows citizens to 
demand a popular vote on a new piece of legislation that is not yet in 
force.92  
The prevalent feature of these instruments is that citizens (as non-
governmental actors) are entitled to act on political or legislative issues by 
presenting proposals, and can themselves initiate the procedure for a vote of 
the electorate.93 Initiative instruments are designed to provide additional 
channels of political expression and participation, emphasizing citizens’ 
ability to articulate their opinions and the openness of the democratic 
system.94 For that reason, initiative instruments should reflect the principles 
of democratic equality, fairness and transparency.95 
The number of countries which have initiative instruments is 
significantly lower than the number that has mandatory referenda or 
optional referenda.96 
 
4.2 Regulating Referenda on EU Level 
 
The topics which must and may be subject to the referendum mechanism 
should be specified in referendum legislation.97 Across the globe, the topics 
on which referendums are held vary widely. For example, in Australia and 
most of Europe, referendums are commonly held on issues of major 
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political or constitutional importance.98 While in Latin America, 
referendums are by and large held in regards to internal political issues.99 
Particular subjects may be constitutionally or legally excluded from 
being subject of a referendum.100 Some countries develop an exhaustive list, 
for example France, of topics which can be sent to referendum or set out 
certain areas that are excluded from decision by referendum.101 Usually, the 
exclusions are limited and commonly applied to issues concerning taxes and 
public expenditures.102 However, as it was demonstrated in the first chapter 
on the example of Slovakia, the exclusions may include among the taxes 
and public expenditures also other subjects, such as fundamental rights. In 
certain cases, even sensitive subjects, such as sovereignty, might be 
excluded.103  
It is very important to determine what issues must, can and cannot be 
subjected to a referendum of the people.104 One of the reasons why it is 
important is also the legal effect of referendum. From this perspective we in 
fact distinguish between legally binding and purely consultative 
referenda.105 If a referendum is legally binding, the government is obliged to 
implement the proposal based on the referendum´s results.106 On the other 
hand, if a referendum is consultative, the result of the referendum serves 
only as an advice to the government.107 The determination of referendum´s 
legal effect varies widely because it´s a matter of particular state´s 
jurisdiction.108 For example, some states enlist only legally binding 
referenda109, in other states the legally binding referenda are the rule but 
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consultative referenda are not excluded110, or they make this determination 
based on the amount of people who vote.111  
Within the European Union, the regulation of referendum legislation 
lies upon the individual state´s jurisdictions however there are tools to help 
build a good referendum practice, such as “Venice Commission’s codes”.112  
The Venice Commission, as an advisory body of the Council of 
Europe, is composed of independent experts in the field of constitutional 
law, with a role to provide legal advice to its member states and, in 
particular, to help states wishing to bring their legal and institutional 
structures into line with European standards and international experience in 
the fields of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.113 It elaborated 
opinions and guidelines such as Code of good practice on referenda and 
Guidelines for constitutional referenda on national level, which are not 
binding for the member states.114 In these documents are listed the 
principles of Europe´s electoral heritage, such as universal, equal, free, 
secret and direct suffrage, and the conditions for implementing those 
principles, including respect for fundamental rights, stability of the law, 
organisation of the ballot by an impartial body, existence of an effective 
appeal system, adapting them to the specific features of a referendum.115 
Specific rules applicable to the referendum, for example unity of substance 
and form, compliance with all superior law and the entire legal order, 
including procedural rules are also embodied in these documents with 
emphasis put on a clear definition of the effect of referendum in the law.116 
However provisions pronouncedly advising the states which topics should 
not be a subject of referenda are missing in these documents. 
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4.3 Direct Democracy and Human Rights of Minorities 
 
In a debate evolving around the relationship between human rights and 
direct democracy there are on one hand, those who depict the people as the 
absolute sovereign on whose will, finding its expression in direct democratic 
processes, no limits can be imposed with, and on the other hand, those who 
argue that in a state based on the rule of law, even the people must comply 
with certain fundamental rules, including respect for human rights, and that 
courts can review expressions of the people´s will for compliance with these 
rules.117 
A genuine threat, that direct democracy may lend itself to tyranny of 
the majority was already present in the minds of the founding fathers of the 
United States when James Madison claimed that with direct participation of 
citizens in government decision-making, “measures are too often decided, 
not according to the rule of justice and the rights of the minor party but by 
the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority”.118 Therefore 
he maintained that, “it is of great importance in a republic not only to guard 
the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the 
society against the injustice of the other part”.119 
There are numerous examples of referenda targeting minorities for 
differential treatment.120 The empirical work (scholarly research) testing 
how direct democracy affects minorities and minority rights is surprisingly 
sparse and limited to Switzerland and the US states, those parts of the world 
where by far the largest share of referenda takes place.121. 
In a number of studies it is stressed out that minorities are harmed by 
direct democracy because it allows a majority of voters’ fears and prejudices 
to be expressed in policies that target minorities and restrict minority 
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rights.122 The notion, that the public´s initial response to questions about 
“out groups” is almost universally intolerant was established by classic 
studies.123 Moreover it has been also shown that white voters’ racial 
attitudes and racial animus affect how they vote in candidate contests and 
thus it comes as a little surprise, then, that voters frequently approve 
referenda targeting minority groups.124 
Barbara Gamble looked at the US state and local votes on initiatives 
and referenda concerning civil rights legislation, probably in the first 
systematic analysis, and demonstrated that initiatives restricting the civil 
rights of minorities passed at a much higher rate (78% of cases) than 
initiatives on all other subjects.125 Next study, conducted in California, 
concluded that there is little overall anti-minority bias in the system of direct 
democracy, in general, but when proposals explicitly targeted racial and 
ethnic minorities, these minorities lost regularly.126  
A US study, which replicated and extended previous research 
through comparison of direct democracy and representative democracy 
outcomes, has confirmed for sure, that as far as the rights of homosexuals 
are concerned, this particular minority is in fact more likely to lose in direct 
democratic contests.127 However, there are also studies comparing pro – 
minority outcomes (pro-gay/-lesbian) from citizen´s initiatives and state 
legislature, which found that both produced anti-minority results most of the 
time.128 According to these studies, the critics have overstated the 
detrimental effects of direct democracy.129 Based on the assessment of how 
institutions make policy more or less responsive to public opinion it has 
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been concluded that direct democracy does not significantly affect the 
adoption of gay rights policies one way or another.130 
 There are two sides to everything, and the question which should be 
raised now is: Can we conclude, after this, that direct democracy does not 
harm minorities?  
 One might try answering this question by focusing on policy 
adoptions. A number of initiatives (especially in US) which affected 
minority interests have survived the court scrutiny.131 This means that some 
racial, ethnic, and sexual orientation minorities have been unfavourably 
affected by voter approved polices, for example, most initiatives repealing 
affirmative action and those banning same-sex marriage have survived court 
challenges.132 Liken to Slovak referendum, described in the first chapter, the 
referendum proposal adversely affecting LGBTI minority also survived the 
Slovak constitutional´s court scrutiny and as a result an “anti-homosexual” 
referendum could be organised.  
Moreover, another important factor which must be taken into 
account when answering this question is the impact which direct democracy 
has on minorities. Whether it is a referendum or citizen´s initiative, the core 
feature of direct democracy is the act of having a referendum on a question 
of public policy and it is of a significant importance to take into 
consideration whether having a referendum about minority rights can make 
the public less sympathetic to the group being targeted by the proposal.133 
Often, the stigmatizing effect of referenda on minority rights in the terms of 
public opinion is overlooked.134 When placing a question about rights in a 
referendum, the state experiences a campaign that not only brings attention 
to the policy question but also produces additional negative information 
about the group which was made a subject of debate.135 It has been 
established, that campaigns disproportionately focus on negativity, because 
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they have been found to be more effective.136 And thus, placing a question 
about minority rights on the referendum will produce a campaign context 
which may increase popular “animosity”137 towards members of the 
minority group.138  
When majority attitudes towards the group (and the right in 
question) are particularly unsympathetic, and when recent rights gains may 
highlight the impending threat of the group, the potential for increased 
animosity towards a targeted group is escalating.139 The potential for a 
campaign to portray a minority as a threat becomes greater at a moment in 
time when a minority group is ascendant, in that it may be perceived to be 
achieving rights that had long been suppressed.140 What is, unfortunately, 
still a harsh reality for LGBTI minority rights. 
Messages associated with campaigns targeting minority rights have 
also a lot of potential to trigger perceptions, among some people, that the 
group targeted by the referendum question presents some sort of a threat and 
activate or perpetuate negative stereotypes and predispositions about this 
group.141 There are numerous examples, for instance, campaigns promoting 
“no special rights for gays” referendum measures produced video and print 
material drawing attention to “the gay agenda,” sexual promiscuity, 
polygamy, paedophilia, and the idea that homosexuality is a matter of 
choice rather than biology, and many more.142   
To conclude, through direct democracy a bare majority of fifty-
percent-plus-one can strip entire groups of people of their rights and thus it 
is duly justified when many argue that no racial, ethnic, or sexual minority 
group can be secure in their rights. Taking into account the animosity affect 
of direct democracy on minority groups the presence of possible danger of 
direct democracy should be clearly visible. In the recent trend of referenda 
and citizen´s initiatives directed at the rights of minority groups, it is about 
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the time to ask a question, what is the road of democracy if it allows 
jeopardy of human rights, and start thinking about what can be done in order 
to forestall such a treatment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 Discriminatory Referendum 
 
On a daily basis, we make choices over issues such as with whom we 
socialize, where we work, were we shop, and consequently we prefer certain 
things and certain people over others. Expressing our subjective preferences 
is commonplace and normal however there are situations when we may 
exercise functions that place us in a position of authority or allow us to take 
decision that may have a direct impact on others’ lives. And it is in these 
non-personal contexts when non-discrimination law intervenes in the 
choices we make.  
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty143, not only the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union144 became legally 
binding but furthermore, it also provided for EU accession to the European 
Convention on Human Rights145. Within this context increased knowledge 
of common principles developed by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (ECJ) and the European Court of Human Rights is not only desirable 
but in fact essential for the proper national implementation of a key aspect 
of European human rights law: the principle of equality and non-
discrimination. For it is at the national level where non-discrimination 
provisions come to life, and there on the front line that the challenges 
become visible. 
ECHR sets out a general prohibition on discrimination in its Article 
14, which guarantees equal treatment in the enjoyment of the other rights set 
down in the Convention. Protocol 12 (2000) to the ECHR expands the scope 
of the prohibition of discrimination by guaranteeing equal treatment in the 
enjoyment of any right (including rights under national law).146 It was 
created out of a desire to strengthen protection against discrimination which 
was considered to form a core element of guaranteeing human rights.147  
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In order to establish a discriminatory character of referenda 
portrayed in the third chapter, this chapter will elaborate on the meaning of 
principle of equality and non-discrimination, including the legal sources of 
this principle together with types of discrimination, and will culminate in a 
discussion regarding the discriminatory character of such referenda. 
 
 5.1 Principle of Equality and Non-Discrimination 
 
The aim of non-discrimination law can be characterised as guaranteeing an 
equal and fair prospect to access opportunities available in a society to all 
individuals.148  
There are three main legal sources of equality and non-
discrimination which are of particular significance in the development of 
concept of equality and non-discrimination in the European legal context: 
the constitutional traditions of Member States and the European Economic 
Area countries; European Community (EC) law; and human rights law, in 
particular the European Convention on Human Rights.149 Several different, 
but overlapping, sources of EC law, such as practice of ECJ and EU 
Directives, establish general equality and non-discrimination norms binding 
on EC institutions, and the Member States where they implement, or act 
within the scope of, Community law.150  
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, containing a list of human rights 
inspired by the rights contained in the constitutions of the Member States, 
ECHR and universal human rights treaties, became a legally binding 
document when Lisbon Treaty entered into force.151 Article 20 establishes 
that everyone is equal before the law. The prohibition on discrimination is 
encompassed within Article 21, according to which any discrimination 
based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, 
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genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, 
membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, nationality, 
age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.  
In 2000, two directives were adopted, which significantly expanded 
the scope of EU non-discrimination law.152 The Employment Equality 
Directive153 which prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation, religious belief, age and disability in the area of employment. 
And the Racial Equality Directive154, prohibiting discrimination on the basis 
of race or ethnicity in the context of employment, but also in accessing the 
welfare system and social security, and goods and services. This expansion 
recognised that in order to allow individuals to reach their full potential in 
the employment market, it was also essential to guarantee them equal access 
to areas such as health, education and housing.155 In 2004, the Gender 
Goods and Services Directive156 expanded the scope of sex discrimination 
to the area of goods and services however, it can be said that the protection 
on the grounds of sex does not quite match the scope of protection under the 
Racial Equality Directive since it guarantees equal treatment in relation to 
social security only and not to the broader welfare system, such as social 
protection and access to healthcare and education.157 
All Member States of EU have joined the European Convention on 
Human Rights which is closely connected to EC law.158 Article 14 of the 
ECHR, prohibits discrimination only in relation to the exercise of another 
right guaranteed by the treaty while in EU non-discrimination law the 
prohibition on discrimination is free standing, but limited to particular 
contexts, such as employment.159 However under Protocol 12 to ECHR, the 
prohibition of discrimination becomes free standing.  
To conclude, protection against discrimination in Europe can be 
found within both EU law and the ECHR but it is important not to omit that 
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while to a great degree these two systems are complementary and mutually 
reinforcing, some differences do exist.  
 
 5.2 Categories of Discrimination 
 
The aim of non-discrimination law, as previously mentioned, is to allow all 
individuals an equal and fair prospect to access opportunities available in a 
society.  
On one hand, it imposes that those individuals who are in similar 
situations should receive similar treatment and should not be treated less 
favourably simply because of a particular “protected” characteristic that 
they possess.160 This position is well known as direct discrimination. If it is 
framed under ECHR it is a subject to general objective justification defence, 
however under EU law defences against direct discrimination are somewhat 
limited.161  
On the other hand, non-discrimination law stipulates that those 
individuals who are in different situations should receive different treatment 
to the extent that this is needed to allow them to enjoy particular 
opportunities on the same basis as others.162 Hence, the above mentioned 
“protected grounds” should be taken into account when carrying out 
particular practices or creating particular rules.163 This form is known as 
indirect discrimination. All forms of indirect discrimination are subject to a 
defence based on objective justification regardless whether the claim is 
based on the ECHR or EU law.164 
In conclusion, there are two types of discrimination and thus non-
discrimination law prohibits not only scenarios where persons or groups of 
people in an identical situation are treated differently but also where persons 
or groups of people in different situations are treated identically.165 
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 5.2.1 Direct Discrimination 
 
The definition of direct discrimination is similar under both the ECHR and 
EU law. According to Article 2 of Racial Equality Directive166, direct 
discrimination is “taken to occur where one person is treated less favourably 
than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on 
grounds of racial or ethnic origin”.167 Comparably, the ECtHR uses a 
formulation, based on an identifiable characteristic, that there must be a 
difference in the treatment of persons in analogous, or relevantly similar, 
situations.168 Based on this, it can be concluded, that direct discrimination 
occurs when an individual is treated unfavourably, by comparison to how 
others, who are in a similar situation, have been or would be treated and the 
reason for this is a particular characteristic, falling under protected ground, 
which they hold.169 
Essential for direct discrimination is the difference of treatment that 
an individual is subject to and thus evidence of “unfavourable treatment” 
can be considered as the first feature of direct discrimination.170 
Unfavourable treatment can be for example refusal of entry to a restaurant 
or shop; receiving a smaller pension or lower pay; being subject to verbal 
abuse or violence; being refused entry at a checkpoint; having a higher or 
lower retirement age; being barred from a particular profession, etc.171 This 
implies that unfavourable treatment will be relevant to making a 
determination of discrimination where it is unfavourable by comparison to 
someone in a similar situation, however for example a complaint about low 
pay cannot be considered as a claim of discrimination unless it can be 
shown that the pay is lower than that of someone employed to perform a 
similar task by the same employer and for that reason a “comparator”, 
                                                 
166 2000/43/EC. 
167 Similarly: Employment Equality Directive, Art. 2(2)(a); Gender Equality Directive 
(Recast), Art. 2(1)(a); Gender Goods and Services Directive, Art. 2(a). 
168 FRA Discrimination (n 146) 22. 
169 Ibid. 
170 Ibid. 
171 Ibid. 
person in materially similar circumstances with the main difference between 
the two persons being the protected ground is needed. 172 
 
 5.2.2 Indirect Discrimination 
 
The fact that discrimination may result not only from treating people in 
similar situations differently, but also from offering the same treatment to 
people who are in different situations is equally recognized by both ECHR 
and EU law.173 In the case of indirect discrimination it is not the treatment 
that differs but rather the effects of that treatment, which will be felt 
differently by people with different characteristics.174 In consonance with 
Article 2(2b) of Racial Equality Directive175, indirect discrimination occurs 
there where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice puts 
persons of a racial or ethnic origin at a particular disadvantage compared 
with other persons.176 ECtHR has drawn on this definition in its case law by 
establishing that a difference in treatment can take the form of 
disproportionately prejudicial effects of a general policy or measure which, 
though couched in neutral terms, discriminates against a group.177 Thus the 
elements of indirect discrimination can be summarized as a neutral rule, 
criterion or practice that affects a group defined by a protected ground in a 
significantly more negative way by comparison to others in a similar 
situation.178 
The first requirement is an apparently neutral rule, criterion or 
practice under which some form of requirement that is applied to everybody 
is conceived.179 The second requirement demands that the apparently neutral 
provision, criterion or practice is placing a protected group at a particular 
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disadvantage.180 The focus has moved away from differential treatment to 
differential effects and this is where indirect discrimination differs from 
direct discrimination.181 ECJ and ECtHR, throughout considering statistical 
evidence that the protected group is disproportionately affected in a negative 
way by comparison to those in a similar situation, searches for evidence that 
a particularly large proportion of those negatively affected is made up of 
that protected group.182 As well as in the course of direct discrimination, the 
court needs to find a comparator in order to determine whether the effect of 
the particular rule, criterion or practice is significantly more negative than 
those experienced by other individuals in a similar situation.183  
 
5.3 The Scope of European Convention Article 14 
 
European non-discrimination law prohibits direct and indirect 
discrimination only in certain contexts mostly because it was introduced in 
order to facilitate the functioning of the internal market and therefore was 
confined to the sphere of employment.184 In contrast, Article 14 of the 
ECHR guarantees equality in relation to the enjoyment of the substantive 
rights guaranteed by this convention. Additionally, Protocol 12 to the ECHR 
expands the scope of the prohibition on discrimination to cover any right 
which is guaranteed at the national level, even where this does not fall 
within the scope of an ECHR right however it was not ratified by all EU 
Member States.185 
 ECHR guarantees protection to all those within the jurisdiction of a 
Member State, aside from the fact whether they are citizens or not, and even 
beyond the national territory to those areas under the effective control of the 
State (such as occupied territories).186  
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 As mentioned above, Article 14 guarantees equality in the enjoyment 
of the rights and freedoms set forth in ECHR. Put into other words, unless 
the complaints of discrimination do not fall within the ambit of one of the 
rights protected by ECHR, the ECtHR will not be competent to examine 
such complaints. So whenever the ECtHR considers an alleged violation of 
Article 14, it always does it in conjunction with a substantive right.187 
Usually, the applicant alleges a violation of a substantive right and in 
addition a violation of a substantive right in conjunction with Article 14.188 
Expressly, the interference with the applicant’s rights was, in addition to 
failing to meet the standards required in the substantive right, also 
discriminatory in that those in comparable situations did not face a similar 
disadvantage.189  
Because of the fact, that Article 14 is wholly dependent on 
discrimination based on one of the substantive rights guaranteed in the 
ECHR, it is extremely important to gain an appreciation of the rights 
covered by the ECHR.190 The ECHR incorporates a list of rights, 
predominantly characterised as civil and political, however it also protects 
certain economic and social rights.191 It covers an exceptionally wide 
breadth of rights, such as the right to life; the right to respect for private and 
family life; and freedom of thought, conscience and religion, etc. 
The ECtHR has adopted a wide interpretation of the scope of ECHR 
rights when applying Article 14.192 Most importantly, the Court made it 
clear, that it can examine claims under Article 14 taken in conjunction with 
a substantive right, even if there has been no violation of the substantive 
right itself.193 Furthermore, the Court has held that the scope of the ECHR 
extends beyond the actual letter of the rights guaranteed and thus it will be 
sufficient if the facts of the case broadly relate to issues that are protected 
under the ECHR.194                                                                                                                   
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5.4 Additional Protection for the “Personal Sphere” 
 
Significant areas exist, where the ECHR affords additional protection.195 
One particularly significant area is the area of private and family life, in 
which the Member States have not given the EU extensive powers to 
legislate.196 Cases brought before the ECtHR in this respect have involved 
examination of differential treatment in relation to the rules on inheritance, 
access of divorced parents to children, and issues of paternity.197 Article 8 is 
furthermore extended also to matters of adoption even though there is no 
actual right to adopt enshrined within ECHR.198 Moreover, the ECtHR sets 
out the general reach of Article 8, with reference to past case-law:  
 
“… the notion of “private life” within the meaning of Article 8 of the 
Convention is a broad concept which encompasses, inter alia, the right to 
establish and develop relationships with other human beings … the right to 
“personal development” … or the right to self-determination as such. It 
encompasses elements such as names … gender identification, sexual 
orientation and sexual life, which fall within the personal sphere protected 
by Article 8 … and the right to respect for both the decisions to have and 
not to have a child.”199   
 
On this basis, it is more than recognizable that ambit of Article 8 is 
extremely wide. Additionally to the parts of private sphere already 
mentioned, ECHR also has implications for other areas, such as marriage, 
which is specifically protected under Article 12.200  
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5.5 Analysing the Referendum 
 
Previously mentioned referendum on human rights in Slovakia (“on the 
protection of traditional family”), touched upon three issues: limiting the 
application of the word marriage only to the union of a man and a woman; a 
question on preventing same-sex couples from adopting children; and 
whether or not parents should be able to opt their children out of sex 
education in schools. The president of Slovak Republic filed a petition with 
Slovak Constitutional Court, in order to establish whether the referendum 
questions touch upon human rights issues. He invoked Article 14 in 
conjunction with Article 8 and pointed towards the possibility of 
discrimination on the grounds of referendum questions.  However the Court 
ruled 3 out of 4 questions not to touch upon human rights issues and 
allowed the referendum to go forward.  
Reviewing the questions of this referendum, at the first sight, it 
might appear to many people, that the whole issue is about homosexual 
marriages or registered partnerships, which in fact cannot be forced upon 
the EU Member States and then naturally one may ask, what is the purpose 
of even discussing this issue. But on the contrary, there is more to this issue 
than meets the eye. This referendum does not represent an isolated event. As 
has been stated before, very similar referenda already happened in Slovenia, 
Croatia and Ireland. What these referenda have in common is the fact, that 
they are directed against one specific minority – LGBTI, and thus the 
question which we should ask ourselves is why someone should care about 
LGBTI rights when in fact these rights are not going to have an impact on 
his/her life.  
Two possible approaches of analysing this issue are going to be 
discussed below. On one hand there is the approach of Slovak 
Constitutional Court (narrow approach) and on the other hand a different 
point of view, taking into account the nature of the referenda, will be 
reviewed. 
 5.5.1 The Court´s Approach 
 
Slovak Constitutional Court, in its ruling, established that the Court´s role is 
to take care of that the extension of the standard of one fundamental right or 
freedom will not lead to a reduction in the standard of another fundamental 
right or freedom.201 When addressing the question of limiting marriage just 
to the union of man and a woman the Court based its argumentation on the 
ECtHR practice, namely case Schalk and Kopf vs. Austria, where the court 
ruled that the Member States of EU are entitled to restrain (limit) the right to 
marry only for couples of opposite sex in conjunction with Articles 8, 12, 14 
of ECHR.202 To support this claim, the case Hämäläinen vs. Finland par.72, 
was invoked, according to which it is not possible to interpret Article 8 of 
ECHR as an obligation for Member States to guarantee a right to marry for 
the same-sex couples. Because of the fact, that according to the Article 
41(1) of Slovak Constitution, marriage is an exclusive bond of one man and 
one woman, even if this referendum question was accepted by citizens it 
would not change the legal status of marriage203 and thus the standard of 
right to protection against unauthorized intervention in private and family 
life, enshrined in Article 19(2) of Constitution, would not be lowered. The 
Court concluded, that with regards to current ECthR court practice there is a 
room to express opinion about the same-sex marriage in referendum204 and 
despite the fact that, this question as a matter of fact falls within the frame 
of the fundamental right to protection against unauthorised interference with 
family life, it does not have a form required by Article 93 of Constitution.205  
On the other hand, the ECtHR clarified that sexual orientation is, as 
one of the prohibited grounds of discrimination, listed in Article 14 of 
ECHR also in conjunction of enjoyment of the right to private and family 
life (Article 8). A contra argument to the Slovak Constitutional Court´s 
approach could be found also in the case Schalk and Kopf v Austria, where 
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it was highlighted that the reference to "men and women" in the ECHR no 
longer means that "the right to marry enshrined in Article 12 must in all 
circumstances be limited to marriage between two persons of the opposite 
sex".206 Moreover it stressed out that it is artificial to maintain the view that, 
in contrast to different-sex couples, same-sex couples cannot enjoy family 
life207 and that the exclusion of same-sex couples from the possibility of 
marriage may result in discrimination in other areas of life such as access to 
goods and services.208 In case Kozak vs. Poland209, ECtHR stated that in the 
process of finding a balance between the protection of family and protection 
of rights granted to sexual minorities by Constitution, the state has to take 
into account the development of society and above all the fact that there is 
not only one way how an individual can live his life.210 
An Interesting issue in the Slovak Constitutional Court´s decision 
was the assessment of the question asking not to render special protection, 
rights and duties to any other form of co-existence of individuals save for 
the marriage, which was ruled unconstitutional. The Court excluded this 
question, as pointed out in the first chapter, because it was so broadly 
worded that it enabled different interpretations and not because it 
discriminated against homosexual couples. It was assessed by the Court 
from the perspective that Slovak law does not address registered 
partnerships, but it acknowledges certain forms of co-existence (such as 
close people or people sharing the same household without being blood-
related) and thus this question would restrict the already existing rights what 
is not allowed. Although it is questionable how the Court would address this 
question if it was specifically targeting the registered partnerships since it 
did not see any problem regarding the voting on the definition of marriage.  
The very much disputed referendum question regarding the adoption 
of children by same-sex couples or groups was seen by the Court as not 
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directed only at homosexual (since, as previously mentioned, adoptions are 
granted only to married couples and no other forms of co-existence have 
this right) and thus not discriminating. 
Considering that Slovak Constitution, in Article 93(3), stipulates, 
that fundamental human rights cannot be subject to a referendum, it has 
been silently presumed that these rights can be neither narrowed, nor 
widened however by its decision, now, the Court has explained the wording 
of Constitution in the way that human rights only cannot be narrowed in 
referendum. Discussing the particular arguments of Slovak Constitutional 
Court by the means of finding contra arguments to each of its arguments 
would take not only a lot of time and space but more importantly following 
this approach would mean following the narrow approach which the Court 
took when addressing this referendum. Omitted by the Slovak 
Constitutional Court, when deciding this issue, was the very nature of this 
referenda where the essence of discrimination lies.   
 
5.5.2 Different Point of View - Exploring the Nature of         
    Referendum 
 
As indicated before, expressing our subjective preferences is commonplace 
and normal however there are situations when we exercise functions that 
place us in a position of authority, when the decisions we make may have a 
direct impact on others lives, and in these non-personal contexts the issues 
of discrimination arise. Citizens of Slovakia have been placed in a position 
of authority to decide about questions directly impacting personal lives of 
LGBTI society and despite the fact that referendum did not go through, it is 
legitimate to question whether they had a right to decide upon such matters. 
 In contrast to the Court´s narrow approach, it is necessary to take 
into account the nature of this referendum when deciding whether human 
rights issues and discrimination are involved.  
According to ECHR, Article 14, prohibiting discrimination can only 
be invoked in connection with other substantive right enshrined within the 
Convention. In this case, just the title of the referenda “protection of 
(traditional) family” invokes which Article is in place to be invoked. 
Moreover, the content of referendum questions includes same-sex marriage 
and adoption of children which fall within the ambit of Article 8 of ECHR, 
the right to respect for private and family life. A claim, that this referendum 
is discriminatory is therefore based on the Article 14 in conjunction with 
Article 8 of ECHR. 
Previously stated, the aim of non-discrimination law is guaranteeing 
an equal and fair prospect to access opportunities available in a society to all 
individuals. Direct discrimination occurs when one person is treated less 
favourably than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable 
situation. Applied to the circumstances of this referendum, it was directed 
against same-sex couples (LGBTI community). Citizens of Slovakia, mostly 
heterosexuals, were asked to decide whether homosexuals should be able to 
marry and adopt children. In other words, on one hand there is LGBTI 
community, about whose rights it is being decided, and on the other hand 
there are heterosexuals, already having most of the rights. When we 
compare these two groups and put them into comparable situation, in order 
to establish whether discrimination occurred, the only plausible conclusion 
to which we will arrive is that, there would never be a referendum regarding 
the right to marry and adopt children for heterosexuals. This would never 
happen to heterosexual couples, since heterosexuality is perceived as 
normal, natural and automatic component of society. The difference in 
treatment of these two groups is more than obvious and that is why this 
referendum is discriminatory. 
In addition, if everyone should have equal and fair access to 
opportunities in society, LGBTI community should be able to equally and 
fairly represent themselves in this referendum however it is more than 
apparent that it can never happen, because they are a minority and in 
numbers they do not stand a chance against majority. Does not this also 
create discrimination? 
Circumstances, taken into account when deciding about these issues, 
should also include the reasons why the referendum was organized. It was 
organized by a group of people, professing the values of “traditional 
family”, with ties to Catholic Church, and in order to protect the “traditional 
family” against homosexuals. Indicating, that based on who we love or 
decide to spend time with, we are different, unequal and thus dangerous and 
not worth of respect for our human dignity?   
But in fact, we are all human, we are all equal and we should not 
allow the majority to limit the rights of minority, not allow people who fear 
anyone different from themselves to limit others rights or deny others 
human dignity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 Legal Protection for Fundamental Rights under the 
U.S. Constitution 
 
United States of America, one of the countries with a largest share of 
referenda, developed for the purposes of fighting discrimination the system 
of “protected classes” connected to a particular level of scrutiny. 
Essentially, U.S. has recognized a problem, by adopting additional 
protection for certain groups of people, whose rights tend to be more 
endangered than the rights of others, and by tying the particular protected 
classes with a specific level of scrutiny for each class, it developed a 
proactive approach, compared to the reactive approach of European Court of 
Human Rights.  
 Aforementioned, a discriminatory referendum took place in four 
member states, characterised by pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, 
justice, solidarity and equality between women and men, of European Union 
which is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, liberty, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights.211 
Respect and protection of human rights can only be guaranteed by the 
attainability of effective judicial remedies. 212 Immediately upon a violation 
of a right of individual (or a group), access to justice is of fundamental 
importance not only for the injured individual but also because it is an 
essential component of the system of protection and enforcement of human 
rights.213 In order to determine whether the European Court of Human rights 
should adopt (select) a reactive or a proactive approach, for the sake of 
accessing justice of the victims of this referenda, it is crucial to discuss the 
proactive approach of U.S. courts.  
This chapter will give an insight into the Equal Protection Clause, 
which purpose is to fight discrimination, in conjunction with methods of 
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scrutiny used by U.S. Courts and will conclude with a landmark decision of 
U.S. Supreme Court related to discrimination based on sexual orientation.   
  
 
6.1 The U.S. Equal Protection Clause 
 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution provides, “No state shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” It was adopted shortly after 
the Civil War and has been invoked often to invalidate policies such as 
racial segregation in public schools, the denial of voting rights to African-
Americans, and racially exclusive public accommodations.214 
The U.S. courts use Equal Protection Clause nowadays as a major 
doctrinal tool for analysing controversies unrelated to race and they have 
developed a general methodology to resolve equal protection disputes.215  
Essentially, the command of equality is comparative and requires a 
comparison of one entity with another entity.216 A comparison of two 
different classes is involved in most of the equal protection cases.217 To 
classify means to identify a trait that makes a person a member of a class, 
for example all those over age fifty, and then to ascribe a certain treatment, 
such as forced retirement, for those who, having the trait, are members of 
the class.218 The typical equality challenge to this kind of classification 
compares those who have trait (one class of persons) with those without the 
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trait (second class of persons) and argues that, the members of both classes 
should be treated similarly because the two classes are similarly situated.219  
In other words, equal protection claims, in general, involve a 
challenge to laws that allocate benefits or impose burdens on a defined class 
of individuals.220 In an equal protection case the plaintiff claims that the 
government has drawn the line between the favoured and disfavoured 
groups in an impermissible place.221 However, a bare fact of treating 
individuals differently cannot invariably give rise to an equal protection 
violation.222 Demonstrated on an example, a law that sets the driving age at 
sixteen treats fifteen-year-olds differently and seventeen-year-olds 
differently, classifying on the basis of age, while a decision to set the 
passing score for the bar examination at 80 treats applicants who scored 79 
differently from those who scored 81, classifying on the basis of test 
performance. And thus, deciding whether under particular circumstances a 
challenged classification is permissible, represents the real question 
involved in equal protection cases.223 
Equal protection analysis consists of three steps.224 In the first step, 
judges have to rule whether the challenged law classifies people based on a 
particular trait.225 The second step requires the court to determine the level 
of scrutiny associated with that trait.226 And after determining the 
appropriate level of scrutiny, the third step demands its application in order 
to establish whether the challenged law survives under the applicable test.227  
Determination of who is similar to whom and therefore entitled to 
similar treatment is critical and at the same time difficult. On one hand, it 
can be said that, all human beings are similar to all other human beings 
because they have, for example, a human genome, and are therefore 
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arguably entitled to similar treatment.228 On the other hand, at the same time 
all human beings are unique (entities with their own genes and life 
experience) and thus different from everyone else and entitled or subject to 
different treatment.229  
The Courts resolved the problem of identifying who is similar to 
whom, for example, by referring to an external criterion - the purpose for 
which the classification was made.230 Demonstrated on an example, when 
all persons over the age of fifty shares a trait that makes them members of a 
class are they similarly situated to individuals in a class made up of people 
younger than fifty? This would depend on whether this age classification is 
relevant to its purpose. If the purpose of the classification would be to 
identify individuals who still have sufficient vigor to perform a physically 
demanding job like police work, then the two classes could be considered 
differently situated, since fitness declines with age.231 However, if the 
purpose of the classification would be to determine who is eligible to vote, 
then these two classes would appear to be similarly situated, because 
physical vigor bears little relation to voting ability.232 This implies that there 
must be some correlation between classification and purpose and this way of 
determining who is similar to who typifies the rational basis review, the 
minimum judicial review to evaluate the constitutionality of laws in U.S.233  
 
 6.2 Levels of Scrutiny 
 
Equal protection analysis originated in the famous footnote four in United 
States v. Carolene Products Co. where the Court recognized that “if a law 
neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, it will 
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uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to 
some legitimate end.” 234  
As stated above, equal protection analysis has three steps: 
1.classification of people according to a particular trait, 2.determination of 
the appropriate level of scrutiny and 3.the application of appropriate level of 
scrutiny. According to the U.S. Supreme Court there are three levels of 
scrutiny: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny and rational basis review.235   
Under the strict scrutiny, the government has the burden of proving 
that the challenged law’s classifications represent narrowly tailored 
measures that foster compelling governmental interests.236 Under the 
intermediate scrutiny, the restrictions will survive equal protection scrutiny 
to the extent to which they are substantially related to a legitimate state 
interest.237 Ultimately, under the rational basis review, a statutory 
classification must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental 
purpose.238 Rational basis review is considered to be very deferential 
because the government does not have any obligation to produce evidence 
to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification.239 
The level of scrutiny applied can be defined as “a function of the 
trait upon which the challenged law classifies people.”240 Legal 
classifications, identified as suspect, based on race or national origin and 
affecting fundamental rights, receive strict scrutiny.241 Quasi-suspect legal 
classifications, based on gender and illegitimacy, are subject to intermediate 
scrutiny.242 Both strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny are listed as forms 
of heightened scrutiny.243 Those classifications which are neither suspect 
nor quasi-suspect are subject to rational basis review.244 Discrimination 
based on sexual orientation however does not have a consistent level of 
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scrutiny. Some courts have held sexual orientation to be a suspect 
classification entitled to heightened scrutiny,245 whereas most state and 
federal courts have applied rational basis review to laws that discriminate 
based on sexual orientation.246 
As established above, in order to withstand the constitutional 
challenge, the government must show that these classifications serve 
important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means 
employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.247 
For these purposes, the Supreme Court has identified a number of factors 
having impact on the decision whether a particular group falls into a suspect 
or quasi-suspect class: (1) the history of discrimination against the group;248 
(2) the political power of the affected group;249 (3) whether the trait is 
immutable;250 and (4) whether the “characteristic frequently bears no 
relation to ability to perform or contribute to society.251 
Step three of equal protection analysis, as noted above, requires 
courts to apply the appropriate level of scrutiny to determine whether the 
challenged law survives under the applicable test. In intermediate scrutiny, 
for example, the gender classification fails unless it is substantially related 
to a sufficiently important governmental interest.252 Specifically, if the 
challenged law fails to satisfy the demands of the applicable level of 
scrutiny, that law is declared unconstitutional.253 In evaluating equal 
protection claims based on analogous state constitutional protections, most 
                                                 
245 See, e.g., Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 989 (N.D. Cal. 
2012); (“Here, having analyzed the factors, the Court holds that the appropriate level of 
scrutiny to use when reviewing statutory classifications based on sexual orientation is 
heightened scrutiny.”); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 430–32 (Conn. 
2008) (concluding that sexual orientation should be considered a quasi-suspect 
classification). 
246 See, e.g., Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 324 F.3d 1130, 1137 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(explaining in a parenthetical that High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance 
Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573–74 (9th Cir. 1990), found that “homosexuals are not a suspect or 
quasi-suspect class, but are a definable group entitled to rational basis scrutiny for equal 
protection purposes”). 
247 Randall P. Ewing, Jr. : Same-sex Marriage : A Threat to Tiered Equal Protection 
Doctrine?, St. John´s  Law Review, vol. 82 (1409, 2008) 1413. 
248 Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987). 
249 Ibid. 
250 Ibid. 
251 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). 
252 Leslie (n 224) 1085. 
253 Ibid. 
U.S. state courts employ a similar analytical framework however the level 
of scrutiny for the discrimination based on sexual orientation differs.254  
 
6.3 Scrutiny and Sexual Orientation 
 
The level of scrutiny applied in challenges to prohibitions against same-sex 
marriage is largely outcome determinative in U.S. because the courts do not 
have a consistent approach towards this issue. Some courts applied 
heightened scrutiny because gender-specific marriage laws classify based on 
sex, and thus they held that the marriage restriction violates Equal 
Protection.255 Other courts applied heightened scrutiny after concluding that 
sexual orientation is a suspect classification, consequently ruling that 
precluding same-sex couples from marrying or having access to the rights 
afforded to married couples is unconstitutional.256 However the vast 
majority of courts have declined to apply heightened scrutiny in challenges 
to gender-specific marriage laws and upheld these laws under rational basis 
review.257 Courts which rejected challenges to restrictive marriage laws 
have explicitly noted that the decisions were driven by the extreme 
deference that rational basis review requires.258 The fact that rational basis 
review is lax and the judiciary does not require a legislature to articulate its 
reasons for enacting the statute have been highly emphasized by these 
courts.259   
Considering that under rational basis review, the state is not required 
to show that denying marriage to same-sex couples is necessary to promote 
the state’s interest or that same-sex couples will suffer no harm by an 
opposite-sex definition of marriage, these decisions can be seen as 
erroneous (vague) given their failure to suggest how denying marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples in any way advances a legitimate state 
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interest.260 Nevertheless, they serve as an exemplification of how courts 
have an easier time upholding prohibitions against same-sex marriage under 
rational basis review in comparison with heightened scrutiny.261  
Although, it should not be omitted, that some courts have used 
rational basis review to actually strike down anti-gay marriage 
restrictions.262 But still, no court has applied heightened scrutiny and upheld 
the constitutionality of a gender specific marriage statute.263  
The advocates of marriage equality have argued that gender-specific 
marriage laws should be evaluated under heightened scrutiny for two 
reasons. Firstly, they claimed that laws prohibiting same-sex couples from 
marrying should be subject to heightened scrutiny because these laws 
infringe the fundamental right to marry.264 Thought, most of the courts have 
rejected this argument by rationale that there is no fundamental right to 
same-sex marriage.265 Secondly, they argued that marriage bans should be 
subject to heightened scrutiny because they discriminate based on sexual 
orientation and based on sex.266 Why invoking discrimination based on sex?  
Because, gender-specific marriage laws, by definition, classify people based 
on their gender and then restrict the ability to marry based on their partners’ 
respective genders, what epitomizes the essence of sex discrimination.267 
Unfortunately, most of the courts considering the issue have rejected 
the argument that sexual orientation is a suspect or quasi-suspect 
classification entitled to heightened scrutiny. On the other hand, some of 
federal and state jurisdictions held that gender is a suspect classification 
what leads to a conclusion that gender-specific marriage laws are subject to 
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heightened scrutiny if judges recognize that prohibitions against same-sex 
marriage do, in fact, discriminate on the basis of sex.268  
 
Despite the inconsistency of the court´s approaches, considerable 
achievements in fighting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
have been already made by the U.S. Supreme Court.269 
 
6.4 Romer vs. Evans 
 
Romer v. Evans270  represents a landmark decision of U.S. Supreme Court 
regarding the issue of discrimination based on sexual orientation. 
In this case Colorado enacted, by a state wide referendum, a 
constitutional amendment (Amendment 2) prohibiting local governments 
from enacting antidiscrimination measures protecting homosexual, lesbian 
or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships.271 It provided, 
that no local governments or its branches should enact, adopt or enforce any 
statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or 
bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships should constitute or 
otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or 
claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of 
discrimination. 272  
The State´s principal argument in the defence of Amendment 2 was 
that it put gays and lesbians in the same position as all other persons.273 So 
the state basically said, that this measure did not do anything more, than 
denying homosexuals special rights. Further the State claimed that this 
amendment served a state´s interest to respect freedom of association, 
particularly the liberties of landlords or employers who have personal or 
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religious objections to homosexuality, and that it conserved resources o 
fight discrimination against other groups.274 
When addressing this case, the U.S. Supreme court leaned upon the 
heightened rationality review, which is considered to be an exception rather 
than the rule in the courts practice.275 The “technique of heightened 
rationality” de facto means that the Court either looks for the evidence of 
actual purpose and, having identified that purpose, rules it out as 
impermissible; or that it examines whether the classification actually 
advances the law’s stated purpose.276  
 The Court held that Amendment 2 withdrew from homosexuals, but 
no others, specific legal protection from the injuries caused by 
discrimination, and it forbid reinstatement of these laws and policies.277 It 
was also unwilling to accept the State’s assertions regarding the purposes of 
the amendment, calling them “implausible”278 and “impossible to credit.”279 
Instead of trying to hypothesize a permissible purpose of this amendment, 
the Court focused on the “sheer breadth”280 of the amendment in terms of 
the substantial number of statutes, ordinances, and state regulations and 
practices it affected.281  In conjunction with this approach, the focus was 
placed as well on the issue against who is this amendment and it´s adverse 
consequences directed.282  
The finding determined that the amendment was inexplicable by 
anything but animus toward the class it affected.283 Moreover, the 
amendment was regarded as raising the inevitable inference, that the 
disadvantage imposed was born of animosity toward the class of persons 
affected284 and it classified gay persons not to further a proper legislative 
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end but to make them unequal to everyone else285 and strangers to its 
laws.286 Equal protection´s basic limit on governmental purpose was 
explained by the Court as not drawing classifications for the purpose of 
disadvantaging the group burdened by the law but instead, justifying laws 
by reference to legitimate public policies which justify the incidental 
disadvantages they impose on certain persons.287 
 Among other things, in this case the Court considered also a repeal 
of anti-discrimination laws through direct democracy (since Colorado 
enacted Amendment 2 through a state wide referendum). The Amendment 2 
was, as mentioned previously, held unconstitutional because it was not 
rationally related to any legitimate state interest. In pursuing this line of 
reasoning, the Court pointed out that the right of the people of Colorado to 
pass a measure which has the effect of singling out a specific group of 
persons and denying them protection could not outweigh the right of those 
persons to participate in the political process.288 Because this group of 
people was denied their right to seek protections under the law, by this 
amendment, the right to vote in the exercise of direct democracy had to 
succumb to the rights of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals.289 
The relevance of this case lies further in the fact, that the Court 
invoked the word “animus” to invalidate the law under equal protection. 
“Animus” means hostility or ill feeling.290  
However, this fact alone did not mean that “animus” makes a law per 
se unconstitutional. 291 The Court received critique because it treated animus 
as if it were analytically just like prejudice towards hippies and persons with 
mental disabilities.292 But animosity is different in quality from prejudice 
because, generally, people do not “hate” hippies or persons with mental 
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disabilities while, on the other hand, many people, including government 
officials, do express hateful sentiments towards gays.293 
To conclude, Amendment 2 was struck down not because it was 
motivated but animus but because no other purpose could justify it, 
nonetheless the recognition of animus as a motive for discriminatory law by 
the Court should be considered as a valuable achievement. Imagine that the 
issue in question here would be the referendum described in the third 
chapter and that the referendum was actually valid. Your mission would be 
to decide upon the constitutionality of such a law. Let´s say that, you would 
decide to use “just” rational basis review. The first thing you would 
probably do would be searching for the legitimate purpose of this law. As it 
was stated before, the whole referendum was called in order to strengthen 
the protection of “traditional family” by restricting (completely abolishing) 
gay rights because they want to shut the mouths of other people, they want 
to make decisions over other people’s lives and careers, and this might 
result in gay dictatorship or  even in mass murders.294 Presumably, you will 
not consider this as a legitimate purpose for such a law and you will find 
animosity behind the whole referendum. Naturally, you would consider such 
a law unconstitutional. Going back to the reality, you will realize that such a 
referendum actually happened in Europe, and the question which needs to 
be answered now is whether there is anything what can be done against such 
a referendum within the EU system.  
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7 Analysing the Available Protection under ECHR 
 
This chapter will provide a short summarization of this thesis and give 
answers to research questions by analysis of available protection, discussed 
in the second chapter, under ECHR for victims of this referendum. In a case, 
that no provisions or case law will be found to stop, prevent or prohibit such 
a referendum, series of suggestions how to deal with this issue will be 
provided.  
 
7.1 Analysis 
 
A referendum on human rights already took place in four Member States, 
characterised by pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity 
and equality between women and men, of European Union which is founded 
on the values of respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the 
rule of law and respect for human rights. The purpose of this thesis is to 
investigate this issue and provide answer for research questions: What is the 
role of European Court of Human Rights in the cases, when a discriminatory 
referendum is approved by one of the Member states, e.g. what should the 
Court, if anything, be able to do about it? Should the Court use proactive or 
reactive approach towards this issue? 
The referendum, among other things, touched upon conflict into 
which direct democracy comes with human rights. It has been established 
long ago, that a genuine threat, that direct democracy may lend itself to 
tyranny of the majority exists. There have been numerous examples of 
referenda targeting minorities for differential treatment in history of 
referenda also. Number of studies have stressed out that minorities are 
harmed by direct democracy because it allows a majority of voters’ fears 
and prejudices to be expressed in policies that target minorities and restrict 
minority rights.  It has been also proven that as far as the rights of 
homosexuals are concerned, this particular minority is in fact more likely to 
lose in direct democratic contests. A number of initiatives which affected 
minority interests have survived the court scrutiny, as well as the one 
described in the third chapter of this thesis. The animosity effect of 
referenda towards targeted group has likewise been observed. The 
importance of addressing this issue has been established and it is about the 
time to put a stop to such referenda. 
Moreover, a real threat that such a referendum will be discriminatory 
is present. As in case of described referendum from the third chapter, on one 
side there is LGBTI community, about whose rights it was supposed to be 
decided, and on the other side there are heterosexuals, already having most 
of the rights. By comparison of these two groups one ends up at a plausible 
conclusion that this would never happen to heterosexuals, that there would 
never be a referendum regarding the right to marry and adopt children for 
heterosexuals since heterosexuality is perceived as normal, natural and 
automatic component of society, and on these grounds discrimination arose.  
One may as well pose a question, why doing the referendum if there 
is a real danger of discrimination emerging? The answer is simple, it has 
been provided for in the model referendum, by statement that since the 
referendum went through in Croatia, the organizers of Slovak referendum 
felt encouraged to organize their own. In other words, because no 
intervention was made while the referendum went through in Croatia, it was 
taken as a signal “to go” by the organizers of Slovak referendum. 
Respect and protection of human rights, as already stressed multiple 
times before, can only be guaranteed by the attainability of effective judicial 
remedies and in order to establish whether the victims of above mentioned 
referendum could achieve justice by means of stopping, prohibiting or 
preventing the referendum, it is important to explore the provisions of 
ECHR. 
Regrettably, there is no autonomous provision within ECHR which 
would stop or prohibit referendum on human rights. The victims of this 
referendum can rely only on their right to access to justice (Articles 6 and 
13 of ECHR) and provisions regarding the discrimination and violation of 
their right to private and family life (Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 
of ECHR). However it is very questionable, if not unlikely, that these 
provisions would stop, prevent or prohibit such referendum. More 
importantly, not addressing this issue in ECHR creates a gap in the law and 
not having a functional system means that you give the perpetrators of such 
referendum a signal to go.    
As far as the research of this thesis has been able to uncover, there 
has not been a case of referendum on human rights brought to ECtHR. 
Consequently, there is no special scrutiny developed for these cases as for 
example in United States of America. One could only guess why it is so. 
One of the possible reasons behind it might be (with the exception of Article 
3 of ECHR) mostly the reactive approach of ECtHR. 
It is more than clear that despite the role of ECtHR, as a protector of 
human rights, the Court would not be able to stop or prevent this 
referendum. The protection of victims seems very low if even any. 
One may perhaps argue that the protection for which this thesis 
argues is more of a constitutional character, and European Court of Human 
Rights clearly does not have any constitutional function within EU. 
However, the Court should still step up, because the protection in question 
means simply asking for a protection of fundamental rights when your 
“whole existence” is put to a vote on referendum.  
A referendum where citizens themselves decide to restrict human 
rights of other citizens through form of direct democracy whilst the state´s 
support, should not be left without a proper response of ECtHR, an 
instrument which purpose is to ensure and observe the compliance of 
Member States of EU with human rights provisions. In a democratic society, 
which values EU promotes and respects, as have been established by 
historical precedence, a failure to protect human rights can lead to a gradual 
erosion of democracy and pluralism, followed by totalitarianism and 
dictatorship, and for sure, no one wants to follow the same path again. 
 
 
 
7.2 Suggestions for the Court´s Approach  
 
As it has been demonstrated above, a very serious referendum on human 
rights took place in Europe. In order to enable the respect and protection of 
human rights it is necessary for such a referendum to be stopped, prevented 
or prohibited. ECHR does not contain any specific provisions which would 
be able to stop, prohibit or prevent such a referendum and correspondingly, 
since such a case has not been brought or dealt with at ECtHR, the Court did 
not develop any approach towards this issue. Whereas in the U.S., the 
Courts have already dealt with similar cases and also adopted a proactive 
approach towards the issue of discrimination by development of the system 
of protected classes. On these grounds, the suggestions for the appropriate 
approach of ECtHR will be drawn upon the U.S. approach towards this 
issue.  
The first step which needs to be made towards the change, in order 
to prevent and stop such a referendum, is changing the ECtHR´s reactive 
approach, in other words responding only to complaints that are made. If we 
want to prevent something and send a clear signal that people should not do 
it, a proactive approach, meaning looking for the problems before people 
complain about them, seems like a more appropriate way of tackling the 
problem. 
It is not a new argument that despite the fact, that we are all equal 
human beings, in reality there are groups of people, possessing certain 
features (characteristics), which are still treated unequally and regarded as 
“2nd class people”. In order for these people to become equal with everyone 
else it is necessary to provide them with additional protection. This 
argument does not amount to asking for more for these people, than 
everyone else has, even though it might seem like that at the first sight, but 
on the contrary, it means asking for the same because these people do not 
have the same rights as everyone else. Within the U.S., during the equal 
protection analyses, a comparison of one class of persons, those who have a 
specific trait, with second class of persons, those without the trait, is made. 
In order to establish who is a member of the “protected class” the Supreme 
Court identified a number of factors, such as history of discrimination 
against the group, etc.295, deciding which people fall within the protected 
class. Consequently, particular “protected classes” have been connected 
with particular levels of scrutiny. Essentially, U.S. has recognized a 
problem, by adopting additional protection for certain groups of people, 
whose rights tend to be more endangered than the rights of others, and by 
tying the particular protected classes with a specific level of scrutiny for 
each class it developed a proactive approach. However, in Europe, we 
should not need such a classification because we have human rights which 
are encompassed within ECHR, a fundamental human rights instrument, and 
directly point out which groups should have additional protection.296 
After examining whether the challenged law in U.S. classifies people 
based on a particular trait, the Court has to determine the level of scrutiny 
associated with that trait. Despite the Court´s disunited accession of the 
level of scrutiny for the category of sexual orientation and its success in 
battling discrimination based on sexual orientation with the rational basis 
review, it would be more fitting for ECtHR to adopt the strict scrutiny for 
these cases. In other words, the government would have the burden of 
proving that the challenged law’s classifications represent narrowly tailored 
measures that foster compelling governmental interests. Only by taking into 
account this approach, it would be clear that Slovak government would not 
be able to defend the referendum, because the protection of family against 
homosexual couples is not a sufficient governmental interest, since LGBTI 
community does not pose any threat to heterosexual couples. The 
referendum was organized and based purely on animosity towards this 
community. 
 At the same time as the discussion about the scrutiny starts, it is 
reasonable to pose a question, whether it should be possible to argue before 
the referendum or after. With the view of complying with above suggested 
proactive approach of ECtHR, it should be possible to argue before the 
referendum starts. 
                                                 
295 the political power of the affected group; whether the trait is immutable;  and whether 
the “characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society. 
296 for example ECHR (n 147) Art.14 enumerating the grounds for discrimination. 
 It can be accomplished for example by adopting a provision, within 
ECHR, which would establish that human rights cannot be subject to 
referenda. It could be also amended for provision stating that the 
government must prove that the law, which should be adopted and occurs as 
limiting rights of a certain group of people, serves important governmental 
objectives. Another way can also be including pronouncedly “animus” as a 
forbidden or not sufficient ground to have a referendum on the rights of 
minority.  
 In a case, that proactive approach described above would be 
considered as impossible or unrealistic, the active role of the Court, when 
addressing this issue, should be preserved at least in a form of Court´s 
indispensable advisory opinion on referendum, possibly conflicting with 
human rights. Upon receipt of Court´s advisory opinion, the State will 
decide whether to go through with such a referendum or not but most 
importantly, it would be aware of consequences of its decision. 
 To conclude, in spite of the absence of special provisions preventing 
or prohibiting referenda on human rights in ECHR and the absence of 
ECtHR´s practice in this area, there is plenty of possibilities how to address 
this issue, nevertheless it is crucial, for the future of human rights, to finally 
start addressing it.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 Concluding Remarks 
 
The general purpose of this thesis is to investigate into the issue of referenda 
on human rights, which took place in few European countries. The thesis 
aims at providing an answer for research questions: 1. “What is the role of 
European Court of Human Rights in the cases, when a discriminatory 
referendum is approved by one of the Member states, e.g. what should the 
Court, if anything, be able to do about it?” and 2. “Should the Court use 
proactive or reactive approach towards this issue?” 
The importance of addressing such a referendum has been 
established firstly by the identification of available protection for the 
victims of such referendum under ECHR. Secondly by demonstrating that 
the threat of democracy becoming a tyranny of the majority is more than 
real when it comes to the rights of minorities, and moreover is intertwined 
with animosity. Thirdly, by exposure of discriminative nature which this 
referendum has. In a democratic society, where we are all equal because we 
are all humans, we should not allow the majority to limit the rights of 
minority, we should not allow people who fear anyone different from 
themselves to limit others rights and deny others human dignity. 
 In order to provide an answer for the research questions, and in order 
to examine whether the victims of such a referenda can achieve justice, the 
provisions of ECHR with the ECtHR´s case law have been scrutinized. 
Regrettably, no autonomous provisions which would stop, prohibit or 
prevent referendum on human rights were found within ECHR. The victims 
of this referendum are left only with the protection under Articles 6, 13 and 
14 in conjunction with Article 8 of ECHR, whereas it is very questionable, 
if not unlikely, that these provisions would stop, prevent or prohibit such a 
referendum. Not addressing this issue in ECHR creates a gap in the law and 
not having a functional system means that you give the perpetrators of such 
referendum a signal to go.    
 The answer for the research questions has been provided during the 
analysis of available protection under the ECHR and ECtHR´s case law. 
ECtHR is an instrument which purpose is to ensure and observe the 
compliance of Member States of EU with human rights provisions, and thus 
in this situation it should be able to deal with the referendum situation and 
help the victims achieve justice by means of stopping or preventing this 
referendum. However, in reality it would not be able to do any of this. There 
are no cases of referendum on human rights brought to ECtHR; there is no 
special scrutiny developed for these cases and no autonomous provisions 
related to the protection of victims. One of the possible reasons, why there 
are no chases of this character brought to ECtHR, might be the Court´s 
reactive approach.  
 For these reasons, this thesis has proposed several suggestions, while 
stressing out the proactive approach of ECtHR, as to what should the Court 
be able to do about the referendum, based on the example of U.S. judicial 
system, which already has plenty of experience in this area. The suggestions 
included the more active role of ECtHR (proactive approach instead of its 
reactive approach); the use of U.S. strict scrutiny in these cases; the 
possibility to argue before the referendum starts by adopting a provision 
within ECHR which would establish that human rights cannot be subject to 
referenda and several amendments of this provision;  and in a case that 
proactive approach would be considered as impossible or unrealistic, this 
thesis suggests to at least preserve the active role of ECtHR by Court´s 
indispensable advisory opinion on referendum possibly conflicting with 
human rights. 
  Nevertheless, the fact that these referenda happened and touched 
upon human rights of certain minorities cannot be changed. However, what 
can and should be changed is the response of ECtHR. It should not stay 
quiet at times like these, within a democratic society, where a failure to 
protect human rights can lead to a gradual erosion of democracy and 
pluralism, followed by totalitarianism and dictatorship.   
 
 .  
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